Biased Beliefs about Outside Options and Wage Inequality (Follow-Up study in 2023)

Short Description: This module studies a novel hypothesis: are workers misinformed about outside options in the labor market? Canonical theories of labor markets – even search models – commonly assume that workers have perfect knowledge about the wages paid by other employers. This module systematically measures workers’ beliefs about outside opportunities with other employers and also conducts an experiment to update workers’ beliefs.

Contact

Year

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Availability

Simon Jäger, Massachusets Institute of Technology, Institute on Behavior & Inequality [E-Mail], Christopher Roth, Institute on Behavior & Inequality [E-Mail], Benjamin Schoefer, University of California, Berkeley [E-Mail]

2019

2762

inno

iverd02_ka, iverd03a_2, iverd12, iverd11_9, iverd11_5, iverd10, iverd11_6, iverd11_3, iverd09, iverd03a_1a, iverd08, iverd11_ka, iverd14b_2, iverd11_4, im_iver, iverd00, iverd11_7, iverd15, iverd14b_ka, iverd02_2, iverd11_1, iverd14b_3, iverd02_3, iverd03a_2a, iverd01_1, iver_mdn_wage_greater_5800, iverd11_10, iverd03a_2b, iver_mdn_wage, iverd01_2, iverd14a_1, iverd11_2, iverd03a_1, iverd04, iverd02_1, iverd01_ka, iverd03b, iverd13, iverd14a_2, iverd03a_1b, iverd11_8, iverd14b_1, iverd14a, iverd06, iverd07, iverd01_3

6/2022